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1 Introduction
Economic theory suggests that the heterogeneity observed in decisions regarding retire-
ment plans, occupational choices, insurance or other aspects of everyday life can be explained
by differences in agents’ budget constraints as well as in their Risk and Time Preferences
(RTPs). In addition, in almost all theories of economic behavior, utility functions are de-
fined over goods, time periods and states of nature, placing RTPs at the crux of consumer
behavior as traditionally studied in economics. Given that cost-benefit analysis calls for wel-
fare calculations involving outcomes that are delayed or uncertain, policy recommendations
should be always analyzed through the prism of these two concepts before they are put into
action (Harrison et al., 2005).
In economic analysis, individual preferences are considered to be stable over time. Ander-
sen et al. (2008) argue that the assumption of stable preferences lies in the ability to assign
causation between changing opportunity sets and choices in comparative statics exercises
or, in Stigler and Becker’s (1977) words, “no significant behavior has been illuminated by
assumptions of differences in tastes”. For example, academics generalize observed choices
among lotteries in the lab or in the field to build behavioral models and estimate risk param-
eters. Similarly, professionals in the financial, insurance and health sector propose long-term
products to their clients based on stated RTPs at the time of purchase. Implicitly, for these
models/parameters or products to be of any use, stability of subjects or clients RTPs over
their lifespan or period of investment is essential (Baucells and Villass, 2010). Otherwise,
if individuals’ intertemporal trade-offs change over time, preference parameters have to be
separately measured and accounted for in each time period (Meier and Sprenger, 2015). In
the same spirit, Harrison et al. (2005) note that if preferences are volatile with respect to the
passage of time, then researchers and policy-makers using out-of-sample predictions should
worry about their conclusions. Aside individual invariance, aggregate stability of RTPs is also
a very important concept in policy-making since, according to Meier and Sprenger (2015),
if the aggregate distribution of behavior is unstable, then individual preference parameters
will also exhibit such property. On the other hand, if choices over time are stable in the
aggregate, then individuals’ plans and surveys may very well serve as tools in the pursuit of
optimal policies in terms of social choice.
A number of methods have been proposed in the literature to measure RTPs. Risk pref-
erences are often measured in controlled laboratory experiments, using standard procedures
such as the elicitation of certainty or probability equivalents of lotteries through incentive-
compatible mechanisms (e.g., the Becker, Degroot and Marshak (BDM) mechanism, first-
and second-price auctions etc.) or the well-established methods proposed by Holt and Laury
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(2002), Lejuez et al. (2002), Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Eckel and Grossman (2002,
2008). Analogously, typical measures of time preferences stem from experiments that either
jointly elicit risk and time preferences (Andersen et al., 2008) using the multiple price list
method (e.g., Coller and Williams, 1999), or Andreoni and Sprenger’s (2012) convex time
budget (CTB). 1
However, lab experiments do have their limitations and thus, field and laboratory experi-
ments should be treated as complementary tools in the evaluation of risk and time preferences
(Andersen et al., 2010). Due to budget constrains, conducting large scale laboratory exper-
iments to elicit preferences from representative samples is usually infeasible. Furthermore,
although the methods presented above have been found to perform fairly well in predict-
ing real life RTPs regarding financial decisions, there is doubt on whether they generalize
to important domains of life other than financial decision-making. For example, although
present bias in an intertemporal choice task has been found to be associated with credit card
debt and creditworthiness (Meier and Sprenger, 2010, 2012), savings behavior (Ashraf et al.,
2006) and scholastic achievement (Mischel et al., 1989), Chabris et al. (2008) and Borghans
and Golsteyn (2006) argue that experimentally elicited discount rates correlate only very
weakly with health-related behavior such as exercising and smoking. In addition, Bradford
et al. (2014) have found that elicited discount rates from incentivized tasks are only some-
what predictive of self-reported time preferences measures, while they also show that using
multiple self-reported proxies can better approximate association of time preferences with
health, energy, and financial outcomes. Therefore, although we don’t have gold standard
(i.e., incentivized) elicited time preferences measures, there is considerable value in studying
the stability of survey based measures.
With respect to risk preferences, Barseghyan et al. (2011) and Einav et al. (2012) found
that many individuals do not exhibit comparable degrees of risk aversion in different life
domains, such as health, disability or car insurance while Deck et al. (2008) has suggested
that this difference might be related to the instability of risk preferences across experimental
tasks. Finally, Dreber et al. (2011) show that the risk taking among bridge players differed
substantially between the domains of bridge and financial decision-making while MacCrim-
mon and Wehrung (1990) argue that the risk attitudes of company managers appear to differ
for risks in the recreational and financial domain. To this end, questionnaire-based measures
of eliciting RTPs in the field and in various domains have witnessed a growing popularity
in recent years (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011). Thus, it is important to study, as we do in the
present paper, whether survey based measures exhibit intertemporal stability and whether
1For elaboration on these methods see Charness et al. (2013) and Drichoutis and Nayga Jr (2013);
Andreoni et al. (2015) for risk and time preferences, respectively.
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such measures can be used in place of incentivized measures, thus, making elicitation much
more convenient and less resource intensive.
In this study, we examine the invariance of RTPs using primary longitudinal data on
survey-based measures over a three-year course. To our knowledge, very few studies have
evolved around the stability of RTPs using such measures in the relevant literature. In
addition, our study is one of the very few that elicits preferences more than twice over the
same subjects. To show how our study stands out with respect to the rest of the literature,
we briefly review the literature in the next section (see particularly Tables 1 and 2). Finally,
the span of our data is one of the the widest (T3−T1=2 years) while our sample size, even
after two years of attrition, is at least comparable to many other studies using primary data.
Echoing the literature on stability of RTPs we find aggregate stability of RTPs over the
three-year course of our study. In addition, we find remarkable individual stability of most
RTPs measures we employ over the same period while only a few of our measures show
instability.
In the next section we survey the literature that examines stability of RTPs to set the
context of our study. We present the details of our survey methods and sample characteristics
in Section 3. Next, we present our analysis regarding temporal stability of RTPs at the
aggregate and individual level. We conclude in the last section.
2 Literature review
Despite the importance of RTPs for economic research, the results regarding their stabil-
ity are mixed. Below, we provide a list of published articles examining the stability of time
(Table 1) and risk (Table 2) preferences; we acknowledge of course that this list might be
non-exhaustive. Note, that we have deliberately excluded studies using secondary data (e.g.,
Josef et al., 2016; Chuang and Schechter, 2015; Niv et al., 2012; McGlothlin, 1956) since the
methods of measurement, the sample sizes as well as time lapses differ vastly not only with
our study but with most studies that involve primary data collection in general. We have
also included only studies that—like ours—examine time-invariance (in the terminology of
Halevy, 2015). That is, we do not consider other types of time-stability such as consistency
or stationarity (e.g., Horowitz, 1992; Gine´ et al., 2016; Li et al., 2013 or some treatments
of Halevy, 2015).2,3 Finally, we exclude studies whose subjects were selected using criteria
2In the terminology of Horowitz (1992), intertemporal stationarity is similar to Halevy’s (2015) time-
invariance but different than stationarity as defined in Horowitz (1992).
3In Li et al. (2013), although the design would allow for tests of time-invariance, correlations across
waves are not reported. However, it is stated that in the case of temporal discounting and loss aversion,
common variance and substantial stability over 1 year is observed.
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related to various medical disorders (e.g., Littlefield et al., 2015; Aklin et al., 2009; Bickel
et al., 2011; Takahashi et al., 2007)4 and do not comment in the text about studies with
low participant numbers (although we do cite them in the respective tables just for sake of
completeness).
2.1 Studies on time preferences
Interestingly, as shown in Table 1, most articles regarding the stability of time preferences
come from fields outside economics, such as psychology, decision science and neuroscience.
All studies that are discussed below involved some kind of choice between sooner-smaller
amounts and later-higher rewards; specific money and delay ranges are reported in Table 1.
In particular, Olson et al. (1999) report individual differences in children’s willingness to
wait for a delayed reward that are relatively stable across 2-years’ time. Baker et al. (2003)
examined stability of discount rates over a 1-week period for 30 current smokers and 30 never-
before smokers with also high test-retest correlations while Johnson et al. (2007) replicated
this study in a group of 30 light smokers with similar results.
In a very interesting study, Anokhin et al. (2011) offered subjects the same real choice at
two different points in time, with a 2-year time lapse. Subjects were 606 12-year-olds from
303 pairs of mono-zygotic and di-zygotic twins who were re-tested at the age of 14. The
choice was given individually to each twin who was unaware of their co-twin’s choice. They
report a highly significant within-subject association between choices made at ages 12 and
14 but a significant decrease in the prevalence of impulsive choices with age. Finally, in one
of the few relevant studies with more than 2 periods, Kirby (2009) collected choices with
monetary incentives between sooner immediate and later rewards from student-subjects.
The procedure was repeated after 5 weeks and 52 weeks thereafter. The common sample
between periods 1-2, 2-3 and 1-3 was 81, 37 and 46, respectively. Their results indicate
high temporal aggregate stability and suggest that the discount rate for monetary rewards
is a stable individual trait. There are a few other studies that found individual stability
but given small sample sizes, these will not be further discussed here (e.g. Simpson and
Vuchinich, 2000; Ohmura et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009).
In the economics literature, Kirby et al. (2002), used a pool of 154 Tsimane’ Amerindians
(10-80 years of age) and a series of incentive compatible choices over 4 quarters. Their results
indicate that, starting from the second quarter and for both monetary and candy choices,
4Of course, some could argue that nicotine dependence falls within this category and thus Baker et al.’s
(2003) and Johnson et al.’s (2007) studies should also be excluded from the review. However, since nicotine
dependence is quite common and might be also present in many other studies that do not control for it, we
do not expect to have affected their results.
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the correlations between the discount rates derived from consecutive periods are reliable
(albeit low). Furthermore, excluding the first period, all rates were associated with a single
underlying factor.5 Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013) report both aggregate stability as well as high
test-retest correlations between the incentivized choices made by 53 student-subjects within
an interval of 5 to 10 weeks. Dean and Sautmann (2014) and Meier and Sprenger (2015)
found that aggregate choice profiles and corresponding estimates of discount parameters are
unchanged over a period of one week and one year, respectively. They also report significant
within-subjects rate correlations in their samples of 960 individuals in the former and 250
subjects in the latter study. Finally, Halevy (2015) used a sample of 130 student subjects
to study various properties of time preferences including time-invariance. Unlike previous
findings, his results suggest that average choices are inconsistent with the time invariance
assumption since subjects are, on average, more impatient for a one week delay when asked
at a later date. In addition, depending on the treatment, the amount of sooner payment
and whether choices are interpreted as revealing strict or weak preference, the percentage of
subjects that made time-invariant choices ranged from 44% to 68%.
2.2 Studies on risk preferences
The picture of risk preferences studies is quite different than time preferences. As seen
in Table 2, the majority of studies regarding the inter-temporal stability of risk preferences
comes from the economics literature while many studies have been conducted over the last
few years indicating a rising interest. Levin et al. (2007) conducted a 3-year follow-up to
62 child-parent pairs from Levin and Hart’s (2003) study, repeating the real choice tasks
between risky and safe options from the original study. Their results are supportive of both
aggregate and individual stability in children and parents. Finally, Glo¨ckner and Pachur
(2012) repeated all Holt and Laury (2002) tasks and several gain, loss and mixed lottery
choice tasks in two sessions, a week apart. They found that in most of the cases, people
made the same choice at the two sessions while the correlations of the prospect theory
parameters showed a large effect size. Additional studies that employed small sample sizes
will not be further discussed here (e.g. Ohmura et al., 2006; White et al., 2008) .
Within the economics literature, Wehrung et al. (1984) using hypothetical investment
scenarios, investigated the stability of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) co-
efficient over a 1-year period for 90 business executives and reported a small but highly
significant positive correlation for the personal risk measures, but no stability for business
risk propensity. Schoemaker and Hershey (1992) elicited CE for gains and losses from 160
5Although Kirby et al. (2002) provide pair-wise correlation coefficients for rates across all periods, they
do not discuss their statistical significance, nor perform aggregate comparisons.
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MBA students and the same CE questions were administered 3 weeks later. Although some
subjects were explicitly given monetary incentives to be consistent with their earlier answers
($10 for those in the highest decile in terms of consistency), test-retest correlations were low
in both domains. Smidts (1997) examined long-run (1-year) risk attitudes concerning the
market price for potatoes in 205 Dutch farmers. Using the midpoint chaining technique,
he observes a strong correlation for the CRRA coefficient. Hey (2001) elicited preferences
over 100 choices between pairwise risky lotteries made from 53 students and repeated over
5 periods that were separated by a few days from each other. During the 5 periods, a min-
imum of 4 to a maximum of 91 consecutive changes in stated preferences were observed.
Also, over all 5 waves, the number of differing answers within-subjects ranged from 3 to 48,
indicating that on at least half the questions, subjects had fixed stated preferences. Harrison
et al. (2005) tested the stability of CRRA coefficients at two points in time using the Holt
and Laury (2002) procedure over 5-6 months and found no significant differences. The same
procedure was followed by Andersen et al. (2008), but this time the lapses varied from 3
to 17 months. The CRRA coefficients were significantly correlated across time, although
some variation was observed. In Goldstein et al. (2008), roughly 150 participants generated
desired return distributions in hypothetical retirement savings scenarios in 2 sessions over a 1
year period (common sample was 85 subjects). Their results indicated that the transformed
CRRA model-based risk parameters derived from the two different sessions were significantly
correlated, especially when corrected for attenuation and investment experience.
Baucells and Villass (2010) on the other hand, concluded that albeit the statistical pattern
among sessions was stable, there was a lot of instability in individual preferences across points
in time. They used only two hypothetical lottery choice questions (one in the gain domain
and 3 months later one in the loss domain) in 141 MBA student-subjects. Straznicka (2012)
examined the 1-week stability of five different risk preference measures which all but one were
of hypothetical nature. She observed an important stability of risk measures between sessions
while at the individual level, the degree of risk aversion had significantly increased with the
exception of survey-based measures that were found to be more stable. Zeisberger et al.
(2012) elicited CE for gain, loss and mixed lotteries with real incentives from 73 students
and observed considerable instability of risk aversion and probability weighting over a period
of one month.
Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013), using a series of choices between a sure amount and a lottery
in 53 student-subjects which were repeated within 5 to 10 weeks, concluded that risk aversion
and probability weighting parameter estimates revealed consistency both at the individual
and the aggregate level. Finally, in Lo¨nnqvist et al. (2015), 44 student-subjects were called
to make the same decisions in the incentivised Holt and Laury (2002) task within a time
7
interval of 13 to 15 months. The results suggest no robust test-retest stability for the
lottery-choice measure. However, Lo¨nnqvist et al.’s (2015) design was very distinct because
it also allowed the measurement of risk preferences from a risk taking questionnaire from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Unlike the Holt and Laury (2002) measure, these
risk-related questions were found to have a very good test-retest stability.
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3 Methods
3.1 The Survey
To study the stability of RTPs, we chose to use a number of survey-based measures
that pertain to patience, impulsiveness and risk (both financial and in other domains). All
measures have been employed in previous studies and have been shown to correlate with the
usual RTPs measures. Table 3 presents the specific questions and cites the sources of these
measures which we briefly describe below.
Patience as a measure of the rate of time preferences has been validated as a survey
measure in Vischer et al. (2013). In the same study, the authors draw the distinction of
impatience with another measure, that of impulsiveness or impulsivity (the terms are used
interchangeably in the literature). Impulsiveness is a psychological construct that is also
thought to be closely related to intertemporal choice since the inability to delay gratification
is considered the core problem of impulsive behaviors. Vischer et al. (2013) highlight that
the distinction between impatience and impulsiveness is important, especially in situations
where impulsive behavior may lead to decisions that are not in accordance with one’s time
preferences. Both of these self-reported measures have been included in a large and repre-
sentative data set, the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), for several years.
In addition, GSOEP includes two risk preferences measures. The first resembles the ones
discussed above, in that it is a general measure of risk-taking propensity derived from a one-
item survey question asking respondents to state their risk perception of themselves on a 0-10
scale. As simple as it may appear, this risk measure has been shown to be significantly related
to actual risky behavior regarding investment in stocks, being self-employed, participating
in sports, and smoking, even after controlling for a large number of observables (Dohmen
et al., 2011). The answers to the second measure, called ‘the Risk investment question’ (also
known as ‘the e100,000 question’) have been found to be strong predictors for decisions in
the financial domain (Dohmen et al., 2011). On top of that, Leuermann and Roth (2012)
reported a significant relationship between this lottery question and an incentivized Holt and
Laury (2002) risk preferences elicitation task.
For a non-unidimensional measure of risk, we opted for the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
(DOSPERT) scale (Weber et al., 2002). DOSPERT is a 40-item scale that assesses risk
taking in five domains: financial decisions (F), health/safety (H/S), recreational (R), ethical,
and social decisions. A shorter 30-item scale (Blais and Weber, 2006) has appeared in the
literature as well as an ultra short 4-item scale (Coppola, 2014) with good predictive validity.
In this study, we took a middle point by adopting a limited (15-item) DOSPERT scale. To
construct this limited scale, we started with the 30-item scale (Blais and Weber, 2006) and
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eliminated the ethical and social subscales which were out of the scope of our research agenda.
This left us with 18-items. We used 12 of these items in verbatim form (items 1-5, 8-9, 11-15
shown in Table 3) while we eliminated three questions: a) the unprotected sex question
as inappropriate to address to parents (we discuss the characteristics of our sample in the
next section), given the context of the rest of the questions which concerned the dietary
habits of children b) two questions about investing in a diversified fund and business venture
which we thought it would be difficult to explain given the ‘take home and return’ nature
of our questionnaire. We replaced the ‘Drinking heavily at a social function’ (H/S domain)
and ‘Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring’ (R domain) with two questions
from the limited DOSPERT scale of Szrek et al. (2012) (items 6 and 10 for the R and H/S
domains, respectively; shown in Table 3). The remaining item ‘Betting a day’s income on
the outcome of a sporting event’ was modified as ‘Betting 10% of your monthly income on
the outcome of a sporting event’ since it is more common for people to think about income
in monthly terms.
Finally, we have also included the well-known Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) that has
been shown to correlate well with a variety of risk and time preferences measures (Frederick,
2005). We do not test in our study whether there is actually a link between CRT and
measures of risk/time preferences; we rather rely on the accumulated literature and focus
here on the inter-temporal stability of the CRT measure. As a note, subjects did not receive
any kind of feedback between waves.
3.2 Sample
A questionnaire consisting of all the above measures was delivered to schoolchildren aged
6-8 year old through two different schools in the city of Athens, Greece and during three
measurement periods; baseline (T1:May-June 2013), after one year (T2:May-June 2014) and
a year thereafter (T3:May-June 2015). The pupils were asked to deliver the questionnaire to
their caretakers who, during two group-meetings with one of the researchers, had received an
earlier notice and briefing about the purpose of the main study which was unrelated to this
paper (discussed momentarily) as well as about the longitudinal nature of their responses.
Because data collection was conducted through schools and in order to avoid confounding
by social desirability or other such issues, we focused on ensuring the confidentiality of the
responses. In particular, each school provided the unique register number (RN) of each
student (but not their names); we gave back open envelopes that were labelled with the
RN of the student to be handled and enclosed the questionnaires. When completed, the
questionnaires were placed inside the same envelope by the respondents and the envelope
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Table 3: Measures of risk and time preferences
Measure Question Measurement Reference
Patience Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who al-
ways shows great patience?
0-10 scale Vischer
et al.
(2013)
ImpulsivenessAre you generally an impulsive person, or someone who always
shows great caution?
0-10 scale Vischer
et al.
(2013)
Risk Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?
0-10 scale Dohmen
et al.
(2011)
Risk in-
vestment
How much of a e100,000 prize would you invest in a lottery
with a 50-50 chance of doubling it or losing half?
6 point scale
ranging from
e100,000 to
nothing with
steps of e20,000
Dohmen
et al.
(2011);
Leuer-
mann
and Roth
(2012)
Cognitive
Reflection
Test
A bat and a ball cost e1.10 in total. The bat costs e1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
Open ended Frederick
(2005)
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
Open ended
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake?
Open ended
DOSPERT 1. Going camping in the wilderness. (R) 1-7 scale Blais and
Weber
(2006);
Szrek et al.
(2012)
2. Betting a days income on lotto or scratch cards. (F)
3. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative
stock. (F)
4. Betting a days income at a high-stake poker game. (F)
5. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (R)
6. Cool off in a fast-flowing river with shoulder-deep water on
a hot summer day. (R)
7. Betting 10% of your monthly income on the outcome of a
sporting event (F)
8. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S)
9. Taking a skydiving class. (R)
10. Sit in the front seat of a car without a seat belt. (H/S)
11. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S)
12. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S)
13. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. (R)
14. Piloting a small plane. (R)
15. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.
(H/S)
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was sealed and returned to the school; then sent by mail to the researchers. The same
procedure was repeated over all waves. Thus, schools did not have access to the responses,
since they were receiving and mailing closed envelopes, while we did not have access to the
identities of the subjects. Aside the group-meetings, this procedure was also described in
detail in the informed consent that children were asked to return signed by their parents,
prior to the administration of the baseline questionnaires.
Table 4: Number of subjects per year and panel sample
Year: 2013 2014 2015
Returned questionnaires 159 157 130
Responded to at least one risk/time measure 122 130 106
Three year
panel sample
Patience 80 80 80
Impulsiveness 80 80 80
Risk 80 80 80
Risk (investment) 78 78 78
CRT 61 61 61
DOSPERT 62 62 62
Two year panel
sample
(2013-2014)
Patience 25 25 -
Impulsiveness 26 26 -
Risk 26 26 -
Risk (investment) 26 26 -
CRT 21 21 -
DOSPERT 23 23 -
Two year panel
sample
(2014-2015)
Patience - 15 15
Impulsiveness - 15 15
Risk - 15 15
Risk (investment) - 14 14
CRT - 11 11
DOSPERT - 12 12
Two year panel
sample with gap
(2013 and 2015)
Patience 6 - 6
Impulsiveness 6 - 6
Risk 6 - 6
Risk (investment) 7 - 7
CRT 5 - 5
DOSPERT 6 - 6
The purpose for choosing the specific sample is that our questionnaire was an appendix
to that of an unrelated main questionnaire which collected various data regarding the socio-
economic characteristics of the parents and the dietary, sedentary and sleeping behavior of
the child as well as other family-environmental variables. This questionnaire allowed the
identification of the respondent (in terms of his/her relation to the child) and thus we were
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able to perform individual matches in the measures of RTPs across waves. The selection of
schools was made to serve the critical requirements of the main survey which was to assure
the recruitment of families with both higher and lower socio-economic status but without
worrying too much about the differences in ethnicity/culture. Although the main survey
took place in seven European countries, the appendix questionnaire with RTPs measures
was only administered to Athens, Greece. Results from analysis of the main questionnaire
(which is unrelated to RTPs) along with details on the design and methodology of the survey
are described elsewhere (Mantziki et al., 2014).
Respondents were asked to return the questionnaires in two-weeks’ time. Response rates
were high, reaching 88.3% in the first year, 87% in the second year and 72.2% in the third
year. However, as Table 4 shows, about 80% of the returned questionnaires contained only
partially completed RTPs answers, lowering the actual response rates to 59%-72%. In terms
of follow-up rates, the number of matched responses in all three waves ranges from sixty-one
to eighty subjects, depending on the specific measure. Finally, depending on the specific
measure, five to twenty-six respondents were only tracked in two out of the three points in
time. We do not analyze data points related with the two-year panel at T1 and T3 (bottom
panel of Table 4) due to very small number of observations.
In terms of demographics, respondents are mostly female, older than the age of 36 years
old and of medium to high education level (Table 5). They mainly live in households with 2
to 4 adults and 1 or 2 children. As per income status, half of the respondents self-reported
to be in the lower classes while the other half in the higher ones. This profile was of course to
be expected, considering the target audience that were primary caretakers of 6- to 8-year old
children in both high and low socio-economic-status families. Overall, although our sample
is far from representative of the general population, it is comparable to most other studies
presented above. Like many other studies that use students as their research population, we
do not claim external validity to the general population but only a contribution to the realm
of studies dealing with stability of RTPs. We do claim, however, that the time span of our
study is one of the longest in the literature
4 Results
Results are presented in the following sections. First, aggregate response profiles over
the three years of the study are presented for each of the risk and time preferences measures.
Second, we restrict our attention to the three year panel sample in order to examine their
temporal stability at the individual level. We also examine temporal stability of responses
from the two year panel sample, that is, for subjects that participated in years 2013-2014 or
17
Table 5: Summary statistics (%) for 2013, 2014 and 2015 samples
Year: 2013 2014 2015 Test statistic
Gender
Female 90.91 89.15 90.48 χ2 = 0.24
Male 9.09 10.85 9.52 p = 0.89
N 121 129 105
Age
≤ 35 15.83 14.73 13.33
36-40 40.83 41.86 31.43 χ2 = 3.29
≥ 41 43.33 43.41 55.24 p = 0.19
N 120 129 105
Education
6-8 years 4.10 5.38 1.98
9-11 years 6.56 2.31 6.93 χ2 = 1.12
12-14 years 36.07 33.85 28.71 p = 0.57
15-17 years 39.34 43.85 49.50
≥ 18 years 13.93 14.62 12.87
N 122 130 101
N of adults in
household
1 3.31 6.20 4.72
2 66.94 62.79 74.53 χ2 = 3.20
3-4 23.14 25.58 18.87 p = 0.20
≥ 5 6.61 5.43 1.89
N 121 129 106
N of minors in
household
1 18.85 17.83 23.58
2 63.11 63.57 66.98 χ2 = 4.23
3 10.66 12.40 6.60 p = 0.12
≥ 4 7.38 6.20 2.83
N 122 129 106
Income
Living comfortable 11.57 13.18 22.55
Coping 38.84 39.53 37.25 χ2 = 4.92
Difficult 29.75 32.56 28.43 p = 0.09
Very difficult 19.83 14.73 11.76
N 121 129 102
Notes: The ‘test statistic’ column displays Pearson’s chi-squared test (and cor-
responding p-value) for Gender and Kruskal-Wallis tests (and corresponding p-
values) for all the other variables. Sample is constrained to subjects that have
non-missing values for at least one of the risk/time measures.
2014-2015.
4.1 Temporal stability in aggregate
In this section we examine stability of preferences by looking at the aggregate distribution
of responses for each risk/time preferences measure. We examine responses for all subjects
that responded to at least one of the risk/time measures (sample size for each year is given
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in second row of Table 4); we do not restrict analysis to the panel sample. This is justified
by the fact that sample pools are similar across the three years of the study as shown in
Table 5.
Figure 1 plots distributions of responses by year, separately for each risk/time measure.
Distributions of responses are depicted in the form of histograms with percentage of responses
on the vertical axis. The only exception is the DOSPERT measure which, given the wide
range of scores, it is depicted with a kernel density plot.6 Eyeballing Figure 1 reveals a
consistent pattern of responses across years with just a few exceptions here and there. What
matters for aggregate stability, however, is not a few differences in the scale of a measure
but the overall distribution of responses.
Table 6 shows mean, standard deviation and median for each risk/time preferences mea-
sure and their subscales. Summary statistics provide some, albeit incomplete, information
about the underlying distribution of the data. For example, looking at the median, we see
that there are just small shifts in the location of the distributions from one year to the
other. Statistical tests can inform us whether two samples are drawn from the same popu-
lation. Typically, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests (Kolmogorov (1933), reprinted in English
by Shiryayev (1992); Smirnov (1948)) and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum (WMW) tests
(Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann and Whitney, 1947) are employed to test whether the underlying
distributions of the two samples are equal. The WMW test detects only locational shifts
while the KS detects differences in distributions due to location, scale, or family. A drawback
of the KS test for our case, is the assumption that the data are drawn from a continuous
distribution, while most of our risk/time measures are discrete and ordinal in nature. An
alternative to the KS test is the Epps-Singleton test, where both continuous and discrete
data may be used and has been shown to be more powerful than the KS test (Epps and
Singleton, 1986).7
The last two columns of Table 6 show results for: a) the Epps-Singleton test for the Pa-
tience, Impulsiveness, Risk and Risk/investment measures b) the KS test for the DOSPERT
measure and its subscales c) the WMW test for the CRT and d) proportion tests for the
CRT individual questions (CRT1, CRT2 and CRT3). As shown, most of the tests fail to
reject the null that the underlying distributions of the two samples are equal. There is one
minor exception for the CRT2 and CRT3 questions when looking at the change between 2014
and 2013. However, the statistical significant results fail to show up in the aggregate CRT
measure.8
6Figure A1 in Apendix A shows additional graphs for the DOSPERT subscales and the individual
questions of the CRT.
7See Goerg and Kaiser (2009) for a Stata implementation.
8In Figure A1e and A1f it appears that less subjects give a wrong answer to these two particular CRT
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(a) Percentage distribution of patience scale (b) Percentage distribution of impulsiveness scale
(c) Percentage distribution of willingness to take
risks scale
(d) Percentage distribution of lottery investment
question
(e) Kernel density of Domain-Specific Risk-
Taking scale
(f) Percentage distribution of number of correct
answers in the Cognitive Reflection Test
Figure 1: Distribution of responses across years for the risk/time measures
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All in all, the analysis in this section echoes the results from the literature about aggregate
stability of risk and time preferences. This should not downplay the importance of our results
since they concern preference stability over a wide time frame of three consecutive years, one
of the largest in the literature. Although aggregate preference stability is important, Meier
and Sprenger (2015) note that a stable distribution of responses could be obtained without
individual stability. Next section tackles the issue of individual level stability of preferences
by analyzing only the panel samples.
4.2 Temporal stability in individual behavior
Given the voluntary nature of responding to the questionnaire and the three time points
at which the questionnaires were filled, we ended up with two types of panels. In the
first panel, we have individuals that respondent to all three waves of the survey. Table 4
shows that the number of subjects which have complete responses in all three waves for
each risk/time measure varies from 61 subjects (for CRT) to 80 subjects (for Patience,
Impulsiveness and Risk). These numbers are reduced even further if one tries to combine
responses to the risk/time measures with demographics, since a few more subjects have
incomplete information regarding one or more demographic variables.
One way to analyze data from the three year panel is to calculate the difference between
values in two consecutive years.9 A person with stable responses in the two years should have
a score of differences equal to zero. Subjects with instability would deviate from zero, so that
larger differences would indicate greater instability. Figure 2 shows scatter graphs of changes
in year 2014 with respect to 2013 (horizontal axis) and changes in year 2015 with respect
to 2014 (vertical axis). Points that fall exactly on the dashed cross lines intersection, that
is, on coordinates [0,0], indicate subjects with (deterministic) response stability for the full
three year period. To get a sense of proportions, marks are depicted as bubbles with bubble
sizes proportional to the frequency of occurrence of each case.10 Bubbles that fall on either
the vertical or the horizontal dashed cross lines, show subjects that gave the same response
in at least two time points.11 By looking at the graphs in Figure 2 one can see that there
questions in 2014 as compared to 2013 which is what the statistical test might be picking up.
9Since most of our RTPs measures are ordinal in nature, taking their difference does not ensure the
ordinality of the resulting measure nor it is permissible to make interpretations in continuous terms. Thus,
we do not use this technique for conducting statistical tests or econometric analysis but rather as a trick to
graph stability of responses.
10To illustrate this, consider Figure 2a which depicts the Patience scale. This figure shows that 18 subjects
fall exactly on the cross intersection which is to say that 18 subjects gave the exact same response on the
Patience scale in the three years of the survey.
11Consider Figure 2a again. The figure shows 15 (=7+5+2+1) subjects on the horizontal cross line and
12 (=2+1+2+3+2+1+1) subjects on the vertical cross line. These subjects gave the exact same response
on the patience scale in two time points. These are different subjects than the 18 subjects that fall on the
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is some heterogeneity in terms of stability of responses. However, there are enough subjects
that fall on either one of the cross dashed lines, which indicates stability of preferences for
at least two time points. The percent of subjects that fall on either one of the dashed cross
lines is quantified in Table A1 in Appendix A and can be as high as 80.8% of subjects for the
Risk/investment measure or as low as 27.4% for the CRT. This indicates large variability
between risk/time measures in terms of their temporal stability for the three year panel
sample.
4.3 Stochastic Models
The analysis above is, of course, deterministic in that it allows no error in the decision
making process. To account for the panel data structure, we explore individual stability
by means of random parameters regressions. However, given that fixed and random effects
panel regressions estimate population averages and not population distributions, we esti-
mate random parameters (RP) ordered logit models (using maximum simulated likelihood
methods) for the Patience, Impulsiveness, Risk and Risk/investment measures and RP linear
regression models for DOSPERT and CRT. Since RP models assume that parameters are
distributed with a mean (provided by the deterministic component) and a stochastic compo-
nent, to test for aggregate stability we are mainly interested in the coefficient estimates of the
year dummies while for individual stability, we focus on the parameters of their distributions
(the values of σ). The results are shown in Table 7 while Table A2 in Appendix A shows
results for the DOSPERT subscales and CRT individual questions. The upper panel shows
results without any demographic control variables included in the model specification while
the lower panel includes as controls the set of demographic variables shown in Table 5. Ta-
ble 7 omits estimated parameters for ancillary parameters and coefficients for demographic
controls in order to focus attention to the year dummies (the year 2014 serves as the base
category) and their respective scale parameters.
Table 7 shows that for all measures, none of the year dummies is statistically significant in
both panels of the table (with and without demographic controls), indicating high aggregate
temporal stability of these measures. On the other hand, the scale parameters for the
distributions of random parameters show a consistent pattern of statistical significance for
all but the CRT measure, indicating instability of these measures at the individual level.
The second type of panel concerns subjects that responded to two consecutive waves but
cross intersection. Table A1 in Appendix A depicts the number and percent of subjects that fall on the
intersection of the dashed cross lines, on either one of the cross lines and the cumulative percent. As shown
in Table A1, if we use the cumulative percent as the desired metric, highest individual stability is achieved
by the Risk/investment measure, followed by the DOSPERT measure, while the least stable measure is the
CRT.
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(a) Changes in Patience scale (b) Changes in Impulsiveness scale
(c) Changes in Risk scale (d) Changes in Risk/investment question
(e) Changes in the Domain-Specific Risk-
Taking scale
(f) Changes in number of correct answers in
the Cognitive Reflection Test
Figure 2: Scatter graph of changes for the risk/time measures for the three year period
weighted by frequency
Notes: In each graph, the horizontal axis shows differences in scores for 2014 vs. 2013. The vertical axis shows differences for
2015 vs. 2014. Marks that fall on the cross in each graph indicate subjects that showed stability of the respective measure
(i.e., the score difference is exactly zero) for at least a one year time lapse. Marks that fall exactly on the cross intersection
show subjects that are consistent in their responses for all three years. Bubble size is proportional to the frequency of each.
A small number near the bubble indicates the frequency of each case. Bubbles with no numbers are single cases. Given the
wide range of the DOSPERT scale, data are grouped in intervals of range of five (the first category being the [-2,2]) to allow
small deviations from one year to the other to be classified as consistent. That is, any particular bubble for the DOSPERT
scale counts observations within a range and not on a specific data point.
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Table 7: Random parameters ordered logit and linear regression for the three year panel sample
Patience Impulsiveness Risk Risk investment DOSPERT CRT
w
/o
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 4.484∗∗∗ 4.408∗∗∗ 3.802∗∗∗ 37.333∗∗∗ 36.758∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗
2013 -0.307 -0.782∗ 0.281 0.349 -0.827 -0.244
σ2013 0.276 0.491
∗∗ 1.229∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 3.985∗∗ 0.243
2015 -0.109 -0.523 -0.516 -0.016 -1.491 -0.114
σ2015 0.554
∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗ 7.651∗∗∗ 0.041
N 240 240 240 234 186 183
Log-L -481.240 -486.379 -443.535 -275.023 -751.943 -284.794
w
/
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 7.153∗∗∗ 7.207∗∗∗ 7.400∗∗∗ 37.601∗∗∗ 48.263∗∗∗ 1.294∗∗
2013 -0.301 -0.979∗ 0.267 0.773 -0.719 -0.170
σ2013 0.591
∗∗ 0.533∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗ 0.348 0.112
2015 -0.214 -0.458 -0.552 0.224 -2.999 -0.228
σ2015 0.879
∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.488∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 3.362∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗
N 213 213 213 207 171 165
Log-L -399.563 -417.857 -390.632 -226.657 -668.548 -227.219
Notes: Random parameters ordered logit models are estimated for Patience, Impulsiveness, Risk
and Risk investment. Random parameters linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT
and CRT. All σ are estimates of random parameters’ standard deviations assuming a normal distri-
bution for the year dummies and fixed coefficients for the rest or independents. Ancillary parameter
estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including demographic
controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
not in the third one. These are subjects with responses at time points 2013-2014 and 2014-
2015. The number of subjects that responded to each of the risk/time measures is shown
in the third and fourth panels of Table 4. We pool together responses from both two year
panels in order to maximize available sample size. Table 8 shows the percent of subjects
that exhibited stability in their responses in the two consecutive years of the survey. As
shown, the Risk/investment measure exhibits very high stability for 57.5% of subjects. The
least stable measures are the overall DOSPERT measure, followed closely by Patience and
Impulsiveness.
In Table 9 we show results from random parameters ordered logit and random parameters
linear regressions where the respective risk/time preferences measure of interest is regressed
on a year dummy taking the value of 1 for the second year of the two year panel.12 The
upper panel shows results without any demographic control variables while the lower panel
includes as controls the set of demographic variables shown in Table 5. Table 9 omits
estimated parameters for ancillary parameters and coefficients for demographic controls. In
both panels of Table 9 none of the year dummies is statistically significant, showing again
aggregate stability over a one-year period. In terms of individual stability, the Implulsiveness,
12Table A3 in Appendix A shows results for the DOSPERT subscales and CRT individual questions.
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Table 8: Percent of subjects showing stability/instability for the two year panel sample
Stability Instability
Patience 30.00 70.00
Impulsiveness 31.71 68.29
Risk 41.46 58.54
Risk (investment) 57.50 42.50
DOSPERT 28.57 71.43
DOSPERT-f 55.26 44.74
DOSPERT-h/s 35.00 65.00
DOSPERT-r 36.84 63.16
CRT 53.13 46.88
CRT1 83.78 16.22
CRT2 67.57 32.43
CRT3 73.53 26.47
Notes: For the DOSPERT measure, data are grouped in intervals of range of five to allow small deviations
from one year to the other to be classified as consistent. Given the narrower range of the DOSPERT subscales,
data are grouped in intervals of range of three for DOSPERT-f, DOSPERT-h/s and DOSPERT-r.
Risk and DOSPERT measures show instability as the distribution parameters of the second-
year dummy is significant. In Patience and CRT, there is some indication of temporal
instability but the conclusion changes, depending on whether we control for demographics,
so this result is not clear-cut.
Given that we analyzed separately the three year and two year panels, one might worry for
robust statistical inference with respect to reduced sample sizes. In Table A4 and Table A5
in the Appendix A we show additional results for the main risk/time measures and their
subscales, respectively, where we pool together the three year panel and the two year panel.
Results echo what was discussed above in that we can safely assume temporal stability at
the aggregate but a general individual instability, with the exception of the CRT measure.
5 Conclusions
Despite the noise and the absence of real incentives for truthful answers, using survey-
based measures of RTPs is of paramount importance for researchers since survey-based mea-
sures make elicitation much more convenient and less resource intensive. In this paper, we
investigated the empirical power of a questionnaire consisting of survey-based measures, in
an effort to learn more about the stability of these concepts that are crucial in economic re-
search. To do so, we analysed patterns of aggregate differences as well as of individual-level
changes in six measures of RTPs.
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Table 9: Random parameters ordered logit and linear regression for the two year panel
samples
Patience Impulsiveness Risk DOSPERT CRT
w
/o
d
em
o-
gr
ap
h
ic
s
Constant 4.101∗∗∗ 2.282∗∗∗ 3.476∗∗∗ 35.000∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗
2nd year -0.081 0.012 -0.068 1.098 0.372
σ2ndyear 1.251
∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 9.704∗∗∗ 0.211
N 80 82 82 70 64
Log-L -169.404 -181.779 -166.752 -284.515 -102.924
w
/
d
em
o-
gr
ap
h
ic
s
Constant 6.740 0.318 13.149∗∗∗ 23.744 -0.916
2nd year - 0.175 -0.159 -0.306 2.055 0.373
σ2ndyear 0.06 -0.954
∗∗∗ 1.227∗∗∗ 11.410∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗
N 78 80 80 68 64
Log-L -149.655 -163.796 -161.294 -268.595 -76.526
Notes: Random parameters ordered logit models are estimated for Patience, Impulsiveness,
Risk and Risk investment (did not converge, due to insufficient variability). Random param-
eters linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT and CRT. Ancillary parameter
estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including
demographic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are
omitted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In line with existing literature, we observe temporal stability of RTPs measures at the
aggregate level. This is extremely useful in policy-making where the allocation of resources
should be based on the interest of the groups and not of the individuals. Even if agents move
between groups throughout the implementation of a designed policy, the allocation may still
be optimal if group interests remain stable. At the individual level, our results reveal that
there is heterogeneity in terms of stability with only one of the measures (CRT) showing
signs of intertemporal stability while all others fail to do so.
Aside the importance of our findings, we acknowledge a number of limitations related to
our study. First of all, the profile of our respondents is very specific and cannot be considered
as representative of the general population. However, there is little evidence suggesting that
the results could be completely driven by differences in the pool of respondents; a fact that is
also the cornerstone of the validity of lab experiments, that usually involve student-subjects
(Belot et al., 2010).
Second, as with all survey-based measures, our approach does not provide respondents
with incentives to reveal their preferences. In addition, since we do not have data on actual
behavior with respect to risky or intertemporal choices, we cannot establish links between
RTPs, as measured by the employed survey instruments, with real choices in the field; for
this, we have to rely on previous studies. Also, as Harrison et al. (2005) note, the stability
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over longer periods of time requires that one take into account possible changes in the ‘states
of nature’. While we do record possible changes in states of nature, we do not know for sure
whether we have recorded every possible change. Thus, whether our results point towards
the (in)stability of the behavioral concepts we seek to examine or toward measurement error,
is a question that we cannot be extremely confident about. The inclusion of questions like the
ones we have employed in our study, in large longitudinal surveys that allow their observation
over time in conjunction with other behavioral patterns and characteristics of respondents,
is definitely a step towards the right direction; data stemming from such sources are valu-
able for the study of preference stability. Judging from the recent flourishing literature on
intertemporal stability of such data, we feel that this is a direction currently well-understood
by economists, psychologists and other social and behavioral scientists. Finally, like many
other longitudinal surveys, our study does not address sample selection and attrition effects.
This requires much more elaborate experimental designs and methods and, consequently, are
scarcely used (e.g., Harrison et al., 2014, for one of a few exceptions).
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Figure A1: Distribution of responses across years for the CRT and DOSPERT subscales
1
Table A1: Percentage and number of subjects with temporal stability for
the three-year panel sample
No change in response in . . .
2013-2014-2015 2013-2014 2014-2015 Cumulative
N % N % N % %
Patience 18 22.50 12 15.00 15 18.75 56.25
Impulsiveness 11 13.75 11 13.75 12 15.00 42.50
Risk 14 17.50 13 16.25 12 15.00 48.75
Risk (investment) 33 42.31 16 20.51 14 17.95 80.77
DOSPERT 25 40.98 9 14.75 11 18.03 73.77
CRT 3 4.84 6 9.68 8 12.90 27.42
Table A2: Random parameters logit and linear regressions for the three year panel sample
DOSPERT-h/s DOSPERT-r DOSPERT-f CRT1 CRT2 CRT3
w
/o
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 12.819∗∗∗ 13.723∗∗∗ 9.205∗∗∗ -0.725∗∗∗ 0.000 0.373∗
2013 0.399 0.311 - 0.343 -0.878∗ -0.286 -0.381
σ2013 1.864
∗∗ 1.759∗ 1.184∗∗ 2.637∗∗∗ 0.054 6.647∗∗∗
2015 0.017 -0.414 -0.579 -24,300∗∗∗ -0.146 14,918∗∗∗
σ2015 1.529
∗ 1.592∗ 1.911∗∗∗ 54,809∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 76,218∗∗∗
N 216 222 219 216 210 186
Log-L -723.423 -764.909 -633.226 -121.05772 -143.676 -123.982
w
/
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 12.819
∗∗∗ 20.125∗∗∗ 11.155∗∗∗ 0.314 -0.542 1.820
2013 0.430 1.003 - 0.067 -0.143 -0.123 -0.863
σ2013 0.662
∗∗ 0.213 1.395∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗ 0.006 4.189∗∗∗
2015 0.209 -1.028 -0.918 -1,284∗ -0.475 9.487
σ2015 0.553
∗ 2.629∗∗∗ 0.561 4.271∗∗∗ 4.823∗∗∗ 53,072∗
N 195 201 198 195 192 168
Log-L -634.055 -656.723 -555.275 -89.238 -112.984 -85.597
Notes: Random parameters linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT-f, DOSPERT-h/s
and DOSPERT-r. Random parameters logit models are estimated for CRT1, CRT2, CRT3. Ancillary
parameter estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including de-
mographic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A3: Random parameters logit and linear regressions for the two year panel samples
DOSPERT-h/s DOSPERT-r DOSPERT-f CRT1 CRT2 CRT3
w/
o
de
m
og
ra
ph
ics
Constant 13.750∗∗∗ 11.948∗∗∗ 9.500∗∗∗ -0.351 0.115 -0.252
2nd year 0.815 0.134 - 0.244 -2.935 0.548 0.625
σ2ndyear 3.647
∗∗∗ 4.841∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ 12.183∗ 4.496 0.770∗
N 80 76 76 74 74 68
Log-L -265.604 -258.656 -226.581 -48.608 -50.376 -45.588
w/
de
m
og
ra
ph
ics
Constant 1.851∗∗∗ 8.943∗∗∗ 12.644 930.656 3,046 -4.032
2nd year 1.246 0.136 - 0.546 - 290,498 2,285 1.305
σ2ndyear 2.749
∗∗∗ 4.762∗∗∗ 2.284 2,700 15,704∗∗∗ 0.767
N 78 74 74 74 74 68
Log-L -246.686 -245.063 -207.368 -22.632 -20.069 -20.619
Notes: Random parameters linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT-f, DOSPERT-h/s and
DOSPERT-r. Random parameters logit models are estimated for CRT1, CRT2, CRT3. Ancillary parameter
estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including demographic controls
shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table A4: Random effects ordered logit and linear regression pooling together the three
year and two year panel samples
Patience Impulsiveness Risk DOSPERT CRT
w/
o
de
m
og
ra
ph
ics
Constant 4.277∗∗∗ 3.396∗∗∗ 3.718∗∗∗ 36.783∗∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗
2013 -1.026 -0.515 0.018 -1.482 -0.324
σ2013 0.091 0.703
∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.625 0.286∗∗
2015 -0.197 -0.247 -0.395 -1.521 -0.028
σ2015 0.463
∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 2.174∗∗∗ 0.177
N 320 322 322 256 247
Log-L -658.690 -676.864 -663.531 -1038.703 -387.989
w/
de
m
og
ra
ph
ics
Constant 6.781∗∗∗ 4.303∗∗∗ 7.017∗∗∗ 43.211∗∗∗ 1.489∗∗∗
2013 -0.293 -0.549 0.216 -1.695 -0.222
σ2013 0.254
∗∗ 0.085 1.368∗∗∗ 0.143 0.389∗∗∗
2015 -0.365 -0.227 -0.256 -2.186 -0.170
σ2015 0.396 0.880
∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 0.606 0.498∗∗∗
N 291 293 293 260 229
Log-L -571.452 -611.494 -583.440 -951.470 -320.493
Notes: Random parameters ordered logit models are estimated for Patience, Impulsiveness,
Risk and Risk investment (did not converge, due to insufficient variability). Random param-
eters linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT and CRT. Ancillary parameter
estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including demo-
graphic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A5: Random parameters logit and linear regressions pooling together the three year
and two year panel samples
DOSPERT-h/s DOSPERT-r DOSPERT-f CRT1 CRT2 CRT3
w
/o
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 13.607∗∗∗ 13.286∗∗∗ 9.252∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ 0.092 0.268
2013 0.516 0.027 - 0.336 -5.331∗ -0.569∗ -0.374
σ2013 0.479
∗∗ 0.195 0.634∗∗ -1.051∗∗ 1.406∗∗∗ 0.349
2015 0.553 -0.088 -0.396 11.930∗∗∗ 2,546 0.319
σ2015 1.917
∗ 0.654 1.195∗∗ 4.398∗∗∗ 47,067∗∗∗ 2.385∗∗∗
N 296 298 295 290 284 254
Log-L -990.829 -1026.179 -861.810 -171.740 -192.217 -171.906
w
/
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 13.057
∗∗∗ 18.579∗∗∗ 10.518∗∗∗ 0.029 1.038 0.245
2013 -0.827 0.553 - 0.331 0.052 -0.547 -0.416
σ2013 0.015 0.096 0.248 0.368 2.510
∗∗∗ 1.228∗∗∗
2015 -0.362 -0.203 -0.583 -0,933∗ -0.351 0.392
σ2015 0.366 0.221 0.702 3.836
∗∗∗ 4.009∗∗∗ 3.961∗∗∗
N 273 275 272 269 266 236
Log-L -898.324 -922.600 -783.362 -129.879 -164.447 -125.201
Notes: Random parameters linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT-f, DOSPERT-h/s
and DOSPERT-r. Random parameters logit models are estimated for CRT1, CRT2, CRT3. Ancillary
parameter estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including
demographic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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